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INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 1999, correctional officers Mike Blot and
Francisco Caraballo stopped and frisked Nathaniel Sims while he was
incarcerated at New York’s Sing Sing Correctional Facility.1 The
officers told Sims to face the wall, place his hands behind his back,
and remove his shoes and pants.2 As Sims began taking his pants off,
Blot punched him in the back of his head and took him to the
ground.3 Carabello proceeded to kick, stomp, and punch Sims.4 As
Sims suffered through the attack, Carabello shouted, “You hit a f—ing officer, you piece of s—-, we’ll kill you.”5 Carabello then pulled
out a pocket knife and swung it at Sims.6

1. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id. (quoting Pro Se Complaint Item IV).
3. Id.
4. Id. Carabello was accompanied by several other officers who were not named
in the lawsuit. Id.
5. Id. at 121.
6. Id.
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Sims sued the officers and Sing Sing prison.7 Although the district
court dismissed Sims’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under section 7 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA),8 the parties had already engaged in substantial discovery.9
During Sims’s deposition, he discussed his subsequent placement in
Sing Sing’s psychiatric satellite unit (PSU) and his emotional injuries:
fear of correctional officers holding knives, dreaming about the
incident, and fear of being cut by an officer.10 Defendants sought
Sims’s psychiatric records, and Sims objected on grounds that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege protected the records.11
The magistrate judge held that Sims had waived his
psychotherapist-patient privilege because fear of knives was not
“garden variety” emotional distress—a category of judicially
determined emotions usually protected by the psychotherapistpatient privilege.12 Further, the defendants contended that the
psychiatric records contained vital information for their defense, such
as Sims suffering from mental illness rather than fear of defendants.13
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs do not forfeit a
privilege—not subject to a balancing test of party needs—by merely
asserting a claim for injuries, which may include depression or
anxiety.14 Further, the court stated, the defense cannot overcome the
psychotherapist-patient privilege when they place the plaintiff’s
mental state in issue.15 To hold otherwise would eviscerate the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.16
Civil rights violations and damages from such violations rarely
depend on mental health history. Yet, the suggestion that a plaintiff
has a mental disorder has proven a powerful defense in civil rights
cases.17 Unlike character evidence and sexual history, courts often
permit defendants’ introduction of mental health histories to prove
alternative theories of causation and even to discredit civil rights
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013).
See In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 121.
Id. at 122-24.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124-25; see also infra Part II.E.
In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 127.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered and Discredited Plaintiff: Psychiatric
Evidence in Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 750, 751 (2010).
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plaintiffs.18 When courts admit a plaintiff’s mental health records as
evidence, they operate under the assumption that the plaintiff
implicitly waived his or her psychotherapist-patient privilege.19 These
admissions frequently go unexamined, unquestioned, and
unregulated.20
This Note considers whether incarcerated persons waive their
psychotherapist-patient privilege upon filing civil rights claims against
correctional institutions for mental or emotional injury. Scholarship
on the subject has mostly focused on employment discrimination and
sexual harassment.21 This Note analyzes the scope of waiver for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the context of prison litigation.
Part I of this Note provides background for this unique analysis and
reviews the rights of the incarcerated under the Eighth Amendment
of the Constitution.22 These rights include the right to adequate
medical and mental health care, the right to be free from assault and
battery, and the right to access courts. Part I also reviews the law
governing evidentiary privileges and closes with the Supreme Court’s
codification of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Part II of this Note surveys the circuit split (and divergent district
courts) on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Courts
have adopted “broad” and “narrow” approaches as well as a “middle
view” compromise in assessing whether to waive the psychotherapistpatient privilege when a plaintiff claims mental or emotional injury.
Finally, Part III of this Note analyzes the three approaches to waiver
through tort law, civil rights litigation policy, and normative
frameworks. Part III critiques the “garden variety” approach for
imposing normative limitations on the subjective experience of
incarcerated persons who experience civil rights violations. Such
limitations reinforce bias and stigma, carry a potential to discriminate

18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 752.
Id. at 751.
Id.
See, e.g., Mara Kent & Thomas Kent, Michigan Civil Rights Claimants:
Should They Be Required to Give Up Their Physician-Patient Privilege When
Alleging Garden-Variety Emotional Distress?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479
(2000); Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the
Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58
DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2008) [hereinafter An Uncertain Privilege]; Smith, supra note
17; Ellen E. McDonnell, Note, Certainty Thwarted: Broad Waiver Versus Narrow
Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v. Redmond, 52

HASTINGS L.J. 1369 (2001).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
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against persons with mental illness, and fail to consider the context of
incarceration.
This Note concludes that the narrow approach to waiver would be
necessary to effectuate the policy of civil rights statutes to make
plaintiffs “private attorneys general.” Although sensible in many
circumstances, the middle view’s limitation of the psychotherapistpatient privilege to “garden variety” emotional distress devalues the
subjective experience of incarceration, as well as histories of violenceinduced trauma, oppression, poverty, and racial disparities in the
justice system.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, AND THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The United States leads the world in incarceration.23 In 2012,
prisons and jails housed 2.2 million people, a population that has
increased over five hundred percent in the last forty years.24 Such a
rapid expansion of the prison population has resulted in prison
overcrowding and fiscal burdens on the state that, ultimately, affect
the living conditions and health needs of incarcerated persons.25 For
example, California’s Receiver—the person appointed by the court to
oversee remedial efforts in state prisons—noted that overcrowding
and staff shortages created “regular ‘crisis’ situations,” which
increased incidences of infectious disease, prison violence, and
inhibited the delivery of medical care.26
A. Mass Incarceration and Mental Illness
Persons with mental illness are overrepresented in corrections.27
Experts estimate that 200,000 to 400,000 persons with mental illness
23. The Sentencing Project, Fact Sheet: Trends in U.S. Corrections, 1, 2 (Nov.
2015),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_
Fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3SK-SG8X]. The United States leads the world in
incarceration (716 per 100,000), followed by Rwanda (492 per 100,000), Russia (475
per 100,000), Brazil (274 per 100,000), and Australia (130 per 100,000). Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917-19 (2011).
26. Id. at 1926-27.
27. Human Rights Watch, Ill Equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental
Illness § 3 (last updated Sept. 2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/
[https://perma.cc/D5F4-XS52]. Approximately 2.3%-3.9% of incarcerated persons
have schizophrenia or a psychotic disorder; 13.1%-18.6% suffer from major
depression; 2.1%-4.3% have bipolar disorder; 8.4%-13.4% exhibit dysthymia; 6.2%11.7% have post-traumatic stress disorder; and 22%-30.1% have an anxiety disorder.
Id. (quoting National Commission on Correctional Health Care, The Health Status of
Soon-to-be-Released Inmates, A Report to Congress 1, 22 (Mar. 2002),
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are currently incarcerated, which is 8%–19% of the prison population,
while mental illness appears in about 5% of the U.S. population.28
Mental health professionals frequently link the mass incarceration of
persons with mental illness to inadequate community mental health
services and criminal justice policies that punish unemployment,
homelessness, and poverty.29 Drug policy has also played a significant
role.30 Because many persons with mental illness cannot access
adequate mental health treatment, they turn to substance abuse to
control their behavior.31 As a result, 25%–40% of all mentally ill
persons in the United States can expect to engage with the criminal
justice system at some point in their lives.32

1.

Stigma and Mental Illness

Persons with mental illness are more likely to experience stigma,
discrimination, and segregation from the general population.33
Society generally sees persons with mental illness as “shameful,
dangerous, and irresponsible.”34 Stigma and discrimination are often
implacable barriers to social inclusion and recovery.35
Legal
institutions also have difficulty in shedding assumptions about mental
illness, especially the view that disabilities are limited only to the

http://www.ncchc.org/filebin/Health_Status_vol_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72LHYZXB].
28. Id.
29. LIZ SAYCE, FROM PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT TO CITIZEN, OVERCOMING
DISCRIMINATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 19 (2000) (noting that in the United States,
70%-90% of persons with mental disabilities are unemployed or not seeking work);
Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, §3.
30. See The Sentencing Project, supra note 23, § 3.
31. See generally Ralph M. Rivera, Note, The Mentally Ill Offender: A Brighter

Tomorrow Through the Eyes of the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime
Reduction Act of 2004, 19 J.L. & HEALTH, 107 (2004-2005).
32. Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3.
33. Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L.

REFORM 585, 586-87 (2003).
34. Id. at 587; see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(1) (2012) (finding that people with mental disabilities have been precluded
from “all aspects of society . . . because of discrimination” and others with a record
disability have been subjected to similar discrimination); Susan Stefan, The American
With Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law: Issues for the Twenty-First Century,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131, 136, 145 (1999) (noting state mental health
systems are predicated on “sanism,” which segregates and stigmatizes people with
mental disabilities).
35. See, e.g., Bruce G. Link et al., Stigma as Barrier to Recovery: The
Consequences of Stigma for the Self-Esteem of People with Mental Illnesses, 52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1621 (2001).
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physically observable disabilities.36 For example, tort law holds
persons with physical disabilities to “a reasonably prudent person
with the same physical disability” standard while rejecting similar
standards for persons with mental disabilities.37
2.

Access to Mental Health Care in Prison

Prisons and jails have a legal duty to provide adequate mental
health services to the people in their custody.38 The legal duty placed
on correctional institutions runs in contrast to the common law’s
understanding that healthcare providers have “no obligation” to
provide care absent a special relationship (i.e., the physician-patient
relationship).39 Although individuals do not have a constitutional
right to medical care,40 an exception exists for those subject to state
action that impedes access to medical services.
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
the Supreme Court articulated this principle by holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not impose an
affirmative obligation on a social worker to prevent child abuse, even
when the social worker “had reason to believe” abuse was
occurring.41
The Due Process Clause protects against undue
government interference, but it does not confer an entitlement to
government aid.42
DeShaney, however, built in an exception for persons held in state
custody against their will.43 Institutionalized persons are dependent
on the state, and the state has “a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for [their] safety and general well-being.”44 This
exception became known as the DeShaney principle: the state has a
legal duty to provide necessary medical care to persons under its
control or custody.45 In other words, the government’s custody or
control places a person in a worse situation (i.e., unable to access
medical care) than that person would have been in with full legal
36. See Korn, supra note 33, at 589.
37. Id. at 618. However, people with mental disabilities are excused from contract
performance and may be found not guilty by reason of “insanity.” Id. at 617.
38. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
39. See, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
40. See Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034-36 (11th
Cir. 1987) (holding that there is no constitutional right to medical care).
41. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
42. Id. at 196.
43. See id. at 200.
44. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
45. See id. at 199-200; see also Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1034.
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liberty.46 Therefore, the state is responsible for the person subjected
to the circumstances of state custody or control.47
Correctional healthcare has its origins in the Supreme Court
decision Estelle v. Gamble.48 In Estelle, the plaintiff, Gamble, was
performing a prison work assignment for the Texas Department of
Corrections when a bale of cotton fell on him.49 Physically unable to
work and experiencing intense pain, Gamble refused orders to
continue work.50 Prison staff responded by placing Gamble in
solitary confinement to discipline his defiance.51 While in solitary
confinement, Gamble experienced severe chest pains and frequently
blacked out.52 Prison officials waited four days before sending a
medical assistant to Gamble’s aid and a doctor on the fifth day.53
After some treatment, Gamble “swore out his complaint” against
Texas’s Department of Corrections and its officers.54
The Supreme Court in Estelle held that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain’ that violates the Eighth Amendment.”55
Furthermore, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes
more than just “physically barbarous punishments”; it also embodies
the basic concepts of dignity, humanity, and decency.56
Once the Supreme Court established the state’s duty in Estelle and
DeShaney, the Tenth Circuit first identified the necessary medical
services to treat serious medical needs.57 In Ramos v. Lamm, Fidel
Ramos began an action against the “totality of the conditions” at
Canon City, Colorado’s state penitentiary (i.e., “Old Max”).58 The
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief for numerous
Eighth Amendment violations, including inadequate medical, dental,

46. Id. at 1035.
47. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Correctional healthcare is the provision of medical care
for persons in jails and prisons. Id. at 103.
49. Id. at 98-99.
50. Id. at 100-01.
51. Id. at 101.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at
104.
56. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
57. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 562. The complaint was later amended as a class action. Id.
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and psychiatric care.59 Ramos held that the constitutional obligation
to provide medical care to incarcerated persons included medical care
for physical ills, dental care, and psychological or psychiatric care.60
Inadequate care in any of these fields, the Tenth Circuit held, violated
the Eighth Amendment.61
The evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence set a standard for
all prisons and jails to employ mental health professionals; provide
intervention services, psychiatric medication, and techniques for
preventing suicide; and properly store adequate and confidential
clinical records.62 In reality, many incarcerated persons with mental
illness go untreated and decompensate into serious psychoses.63
Those that do receive mental health services likely have the most
severe mental health needs, which are usually determined through a
screening procedure.64 Prison conditions and understaffing, however,
disrupt psychological and psychiatric treatment.65 This is not to
understate the presence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
anxiety, depression, and a sense of helplessness that affects many
incarcerated persons.66 If a mental health concern goes untreated by
a licensed mental health professional, many incarcerated persons seek
counseling from other prison health workers, such as prison nurses.67
Still, many incarcerated persons go without adequate mental
healthcare—not to mention physical healthcare.68 It is no surprise,

59. Id.
60. Id. at 574.
61. Id. at 575.
62. Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3.
63. See Rivera, supra note 31, at 109-10; Human Rights Watch, supra note 27, § 3
(quoting an anonymous prison psychiatrist, “[w]e are literally drowning in patients,
running around trying to put our fingers in the bursting dikes, while hundreds of men
continue to deteriorate psychiatrically before our eyes into serious psychoses”).
64. See Rivera, supra note 31, at 125.
65. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
66. Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 259 (2013).
67. See In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2008). Nathaniel Sims had sought
assistance from a prison nurse and explained his fears and concerns to her about
correctional officers. Id. at 123.
68. See Kelly Bedard & H.E. Frech III, Prison Health Care: Is Contracting Out
Healthy?, (U.C. Santa Barbara Dep’t of Econ. 5, Working Paper No. 11, 2007) (citing
MARGO SCHLANGER, INMATE LITIGATION: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY, NAT’L
INST. OF CORRECTIONS INFO. CTR. (NICIC), LJN EXCHANGE (2003)) (noting the
vagueness of the “reasonably adequate medical care” standard).
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then, that inadequate medical care accounts for a significant portion
of prison litigation.69
B.

Vindicating the Rights of the Incarcerated

Incarcerated persons may vindicate their Eighth Amendment
rights through civil litigation.70 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”), they may sue state and federal officials who have violated
their constitutional rights “under color of any” state law.71 Courts
have described Section 1983 actions as a “species of tort liability.”72
Tort law principles, therefore, help courts determine the relevant
evidence that supports or limits a damage claim in a civil rights
action.73 In general, plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for all
damages proximately caused by the defendant(s) even if “aggravated
by reason of a preexisting physical or mental condition.”74 Thus, a
defendant may not use the plaintiff’s mental or emotional
vulnerability to escape liability for aggravated mental or emotional
distress damages.75
The most litigated matters in prison litigation include physical
assaults, inadequate medical care, due process violations in
disciplinary sanctions, and living conditions, such as nutrition or
sanitation.76 On their face, inmate complaints are anything but trivial
or undeserving of serious concern.77 In 1995, prison litigation
accounted for 19% of the federal civil docket (nearly 40,000 cases)—a
reflection on prison conditions and the treatment of the
incarcerated.78 However, the PLRA, which was a rider to an
appropriations bill, reduced prison litigation by 43% in five years
despite a concomitant 23% increase in the prison population overall.79
This dramatic decline in prison litigation is attendant to the PLRA’s
69. Id.; see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555,
1571 n.48 (2003) (noting that medical care cases make up 10.8% to 25% of all inmate
litigation).
70. See Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1570-71.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2014); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 427-28 (1971).
72. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
73. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 122.
74. Id. at 122 (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D DAMAGES § 239 (2003)).
75. Id.
76. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1570-71. Incarcerated persons also litigate
freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and access to courts or mail cases. Id. at
1571.
77. Id. at 1573.
78. Id. at 1558.
79. Id. at 1559-60.
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additional procedural hurdles imposed upon incarcerated persons
rather than substantive reforms in correctional institutions.80

1.

The PLRA’s Filing Fees

One of the PLRA’s most imposing hurdles requires incarcerated
litigants to pay filing fees for all actions, despite indigence, and
requires “frequent filers” to pay all filing fees in advance.81 The
PLRA’s filing fee provision conceptually operates within an economic
theory of incentives.82 The fees are intended to deter potential
plaintiffs from filing cases expected to yield values lower than the fee
but would proceed with cases expected to yield higher values than the
fee.83 Far from nominal, $150 court filing fees are equivalent to
months or more of prison labor.84 If an incarcerated person does not
succeed on the merits of their case, the filing fee comes out of their
prison account.85
Any incarcerated person may become a “frequent filer” after a
court strikes down three of their claims.86 “Frequent filers” must pay
the entire $150 fee in advance regardless of indigence.87 Congress
intended to eliminate jailhouse lawyers from filing lawsuits or
assisting other inmates in their lawsuits through the “frequent filer”
provision.88 With the imposition of fees and “three-strike” penalties,
the provision effectively eliminates litigation as a means to redress
grievances and reduces an incarcerated person’s access to legal
assistance.89

80. Id. at 1644.
81. See id. at 1645; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA also limits attorney’s
fees, which effectively reduces successful prisoner litigation. Schlanger, supra note 69,
at 1654.
82. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1646.
83. Id. The “value” of the case is the chance of success and expected damages. Id.
84. Id. at 1646. The average minimum wage for prisoners paid by the states for
non-industry work is $0.93 an hour. See Peter Wagner, The Prison Index, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (2003), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html.
[https://perma.cc/UD96-A4RH].
85. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1645.
86. See id. at 1649. Schlanger notes that a “strike” may only entail failure to state
a claim or dismissal as a frivolous lawsuit. Losing on summary judgment or at trial
would not count. Id.
87. Id. at 1648.
88. Id.
89. See id.
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The PLRA’s Mandate to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The PLRA’s highest hurdle requires incarcerated persons to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing Section 1983 actions.90
Prison grievance systems often have no time limit, no limit on
procedural complexity or difficulty, and no rules to govern the
grievance process.91 Administrative remedies all too often foreclose
judicial review of constitutional violations.92 Moreover, the grievance
process does not necessarily consider the “fit” between a claim for
relief and the administrative remedies available.93 Incarcerated
persons, therefore, are left with a complex and potentially unending
set of obstacles before seeking redress for a civil rights violation.

3.

The PLRA’s Limitation on Damages

In addition to creating monetary and procedural obstacles, the
PLRA effectively prohibits incarcerated persons from recovering for
a mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical
injury or the commission of a sexual act.94 This provision eliminates
claims seeking relief from threats or poor living conditions.95
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“Section 1997e(e)”) seemingly
absolves prison officials from liability for mental and emotional
injury, the provision does not preclude injunctive relief, which saves
the statute from unconstitutionality.96 For example, an incarcerated
person exposed to asbestos while working in a prison kitchen may not
sue for mental or emotional injury without demonstrating a
concomitant physical injury.97

90. Id. at 1649; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”).
91. See Amy Petre Hill, Death Through Administrative Indifference: The Prison

Litigation Reform Act Allows Women to Die in California’s Substandard Prison
Health Care System, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 223, 239-40 (2002).
92. Id. at 240-42.
93. Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1651.

94. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“Limitation on recovery. No Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act”).
95. See Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1630.
96. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court
Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 435-36 (2001) (citing Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459
(7th Cir. 1997)).
97. Zehner, 133 F.3d at 460-61.
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Mental or emotional injuries are also ambiguous and undefined in
the PLRA.98 Such injuries could range from “stress, fear, and
depression” to deprivation caused by prison policies that prevent an
incarcerated person from attending religious services,99 physical
removal from ordinary prison life, and enforced idleness.100 Similar
provisions exist under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)101 that
prevent incarcerated persons from claiming mental or emotional
injuries “without a prior showing of physical injury.”102 The laws
governing prison litigation, for the most part, preclude or chill claims
for mental or emotional injury.103 This Note recognizes the difficulty
in putting forward these claims before turning to the psychotherapistpatient privilege.
C.

The Development of Evidentiary Privileges

The justice system depends on fair and accurate evidence to
resolve disputes.104 Its fundamental maxim is that “the public . . . has
a right to every man’s evidence.”105 Evidentiary privileges, however,
exempt certain information from the fact-finding process.106 A party
in litigation may invoke a privilege during pre-trial discovery or
attempt to compel testimony without losing the right to advance a
claim or defense related to the privileged material.107
Privilege law concerns “extrinsic social policy” that places certain
values and social relationships above judicial truth-seeking and
efficiency.108 Privileges safeguard privacy, freedom, trust, and honor
in important social and professional relationships.109 Privileges also
further certain professional interests by encouraging individual clients

98. Boston, supra note 96, at 437.
99. See Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000).
100. Boston, supra note 96, at 438-39.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2014).
102. 28 US.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2013).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
104. 6 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 43.1
(7th ed. 2014).
105. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940)).
106. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); see generally 2
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5.2 (4th
ed. 2014).
107. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.2.
108. Id. cf. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 547 (1827)
(“Evidence is the basis for justice: exclude evidence and you exclude justice.”).
109. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.2.
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to engage in open and candid communication.110 Additionally, they
allow professionals to avoid the ethical dilemma of seeking
information necessary for the delivery of services without placing
their client at risk for future liability or embarrassment.111
Evidentiary privileges, therefore, promote a public good that
transcends “the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining truth [in court].”112
The types of recognized privileges vary among state courts and
between state and federal courts.113 To determine whether a privilege
exists, lawmakers and scholars often employ a four-part test
developed by the Dean of Northwestern Law School, John Henry
Wigmore, who became well known in the early twentieth century
after publication of his treatise on evidence.114 The test considers the
following factors: (1) whether communication in the usual
circumstances of a professional relationship originates “in a
confidence that it will not be disclosed”;115 (2) the necessity of
confidentiality to achieve the purpose of the professional
relationship;116 (3) whether the relationship should be fostered;117
and, (4) whether fear of disclosure may cause greater injury to the
professional relationship than the expected benefit in obtaining
testimony.118 Wigmore’s test has influenced legislators and courts for
decades and has effectively limited evidentiary privileges to a small
handful of relationships, such as the attorney-client relationship.119
Wigmore opposed evidentiary privileges.120 He took a strict
rationalist and empirical approach to evidence and questioned
“humanistic rationales” for privileges.121
Wigmore’s texts still

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (citing Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
113. Christina L. Lewis, Note, The Exploitation of Trust: The PsychotherapistPatient Privilege in Alaska as Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV.
295, 298 (2001) (citing STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE
647 (2000)).
114. Id. at 297-98; 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON
LAW § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
115. Lewis, supra note 113, at 298.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 10 (1966)).
119. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 91 n.57.
120. Id. at 91.
121. Id.
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influence judicial opinions as courts tend to disfavor privileges as
impediments to the truth-seeking process and construe such privileges
strictly.122 For example, when state legislatures began enacting
physician-patient privileges, courts and legal scholars vociferously
resisted its inclusion in the Model Code of Evidence because “secrecy
in court is prima facie calamitous.”123 However, attorneys from
jurisdictions that enacted legislation to create the privilege lobbied for
its inclusion, which eventually led to a compromise through a broad
“patient-litigant exception.”124 If a patient’s condition is an element
or factor in a lawsuit, then the patient loses their physician-patient
privilege because the condition has been disclosed to the world
through the suit itself.125
D. Federal Rules of Evidence and Privilege
The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to evidentiary privileges in
federal civil rights litigation.126 In Article V of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, the House Committee on the Judiciary originally
set forth thirteen rules related to evidentiary privileges.127 Nine rules
define specific privileges that fall outside the privileges already
enumerated in the Constitution,128 and three others addressed
collateral problems related to the waiver of privilege.129 The House,
however, eliminated all thirteen proposed rules and replaced them
with one: Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (Rule 501).130 Rule 501
provided that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by United States
courts in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of
privilege” unless the Constitution, federal statute, or Supreme Court

122. Id. at 92.
123. Id. (quoting Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor’s Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52
YALE L.J. 607, 609 (1942)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 92-93.
126. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.4.
127. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1975).
128. Id. Originally, the House Rules recognized a privilege in required reports,
attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to
clergymen, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official information,
and identity of an informer. NOTES OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO.
93-650, at 8 (1975).
129. Id. Collateral problems included voluntary waiver by disclosure, disclosure by
compulsion or without an opportunity to claim privilege, and jury instructions. Id.
130. Id.; FED. R. EVID. 501.
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rules provide otherwise.131 The Conference Committee later adopted
the House provision, which Congress enacted in 1975.132
Federal courts generally recognize the traditional common law
privileges,133 but resist claims of new privileges.134 Although Rule 501
does not require federal courts to recognize state-created privileges,
federal courts tend to accept state privileges on the basis of “comity”
and “reason and experience.”135 Privilege claims are viewed with an
eye toward underlying values rather than litigation impact.136
Although pragmatic and utilitarian reasons justify many professional
privileges, underlying values demand a focus on individual freedom,
privacy and trust, and ethical and moral convictions to justify a
privilege.137
E.

The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

In 1996, the Supreme Court recognized the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.138 The Court held that confidential
communications between a psychotherapist and her patient in the
course of treatment or diagnosis are protected under Rule 501.139
131. FED. R. EVID. 501.
132. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
133. MUELLER &, supra note 106, § 5.4 (identifying the common law privileges as
attorney-client, spousal testimonial, spousal confidential communications, clergymanpenitent, and qualified privileges for trade secrets, secrets of state, informer’s
identity, political vote, and the highly qualified journalist’s privilege) (citations
omitted).
134. Id. (noting that federal courts do not recognize an accountant-client privilege,
physician-patient privilege, and parent-child or other family member privileges other
than spouses); see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining
to recognize a parent-child privilege).
135. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (noting that comity is neither an
absolute obligation nor courtesy and good will); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 126, § 5.4.
136. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 126, § 5.4.
137. Id. In contrast to Wigmore’s four-part test, Mueller and Kirkpatrick suggest
an alternative six-part test that emphasizes social relationships and moral values. Id.
Accordingly, proposed new privileges should examine: “(1) the importance to the
community of the relationship sought to be protected; (2) whether community values
would be offended by governmental intrusion into the privacy of the relationship; (3)
the extent to which social traditions and professional standards create a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality in such a relationship; (4) whether the purpose of the
relationship depends on full and open communication; (5) the extent to which such
communication would be impeded if it goes unprotected by a privilege; and (6) the
benefits to the public from encouraging the communication and protecting the
privacy of the relationship in comparison to the cost to the litigation process resulting
from the loss of evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).
138. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
139. Id. at 15.
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Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, analogized to the spousal
and attorney-client privilege and found that reason and experience
demonstrate the psychotherapist-patient privilege “promotes
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative
evidence.”140 The privilege covers all confidential communications
made to licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers
acting in the course of psychotherapy.141
Jaffee, however, presented a unique case where the plaintiff sought
the defendant’s psychotherapy records.142 Defendant-Mary Lu
Redmond, a former police officer in Illinois, had responded to a
“fight in progress” at an apartment complex.143 When Redmond
approached the building, several men burst out of the building, one
waving a pipe and one—Ricky Allen—brandishing a butcher knife.144
Redmond shot and killed Allen, who allegedly disregarded
Redmond’s commands and “was about to stab the man he was
chasing.”145 Allen’s estate filed a civil rights suit alleging excessive
force under Section 1983.146 During trial, the plaintiff presented
evidence that contradicted Redmond’s story, including testimony that
Redmond drew her gun before exiting the squad car and that Allen
was unarmed.147 When the plaintiff sought to discover notes from a
licensed social worker that Redmond saw after the shooting,
Redmond refused to turn them over.148 The jury was allowed to draw
an adverse inference and, subsequently, found for Allen’s estate.149
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed and concluded that “reason
and experience” among all fifty states who had adopted the
psychotherapist-patient privilege barred disclosure.150

140. Id. at 9-10 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“Like the
spousal and attorney-client privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is ‘rooted
in the imperative need for confidence and trust.’”)).
141. Id. at 15.
142. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 5; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioner also filed suit for damages and
wrongful-death. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-2.2 (1994).
147. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5-6. The jury awarded the petitioner $45,000 on the federal claim and
$500,000 on the state-law claim. Id.
150. Id. at 6; Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355, 1358 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized in light of therapy
records with minimal probative value as compared with Redmond’s substantial
privacy interests).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Seventh Circuit case
because other circuit courts had split on whether to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.151
Although
recognizing the privilege, the Court’s rationale in Jaffee was
exclusively instrumental.152 As the Court noted, the imperative for
confidence, trust, and effective psychotherapy requires “[a patient] to
make frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories,
and fears.”153 The psychotherapist-patient privilege serves the
“mental health of our citizenry . . . a public good of transcendent
importance.”154 Finally, the Court reasoned, all fifty states and the
District of Columbia recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.155
To effectuate the privilege, Jaffee said patients “must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty” the confidentiality of
conversations with psychotherapists: “An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications
by courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”156 Jaffee, therefore,
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s balancing of privacy interests against
disclosure and, instead, adopted an absolute psychotherapist-patient
privilege.157
But could the patient waive her psychotherapist privilege? Jaffee
only recognized the possibility of waiver in a footnote, without
reference to the circumstances of waiver.158 In fact, the Court refused
to “speculate about most future developments in the federal
psychotherapist privilege.”159 But the comparison of waiver to “other
testimonial privileges” paved the way for future courts to reason by
analogy—whether to the attorney-client or spousal privilege—in
making waiver determinations.
Justice Scalia, joined in part by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.160
Justice Scalia focused on the instrumental rationale motivating the
privilege (“successful psychotherapy treatment”) and the traditional
judicial preference for truth in arguing that the Court created an ill-

151. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7 (citations omitted).
152. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 99.
153. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
157. Id. at 17-18.
158. Id. at 15 n.14 (“Like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course
waive the protection.”).
159. Id. at 18 n.19.
160. Id. at 18.
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defined privilege by including social workers.161 As an instrument
that may prevent proving a valid claim or establishing a valid defense,
Justice Scalia argued that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would
transform courts of law into “instruments of wrong” as opposed to
justice.162 Justice Scalia also questioned whether the normal rules of
evidence would even undermine psychotherapy.163
Since Jaffee, some scholars have challenged the instrumental
rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege on empirical
grounds.164
Confidentiality is important in the therapeutic
relationship, while an evidentiary privilege is not.165 Instead, the
Supreme Court could have better justified the psychotherapist-patient
privilege through a “humanistic rationale” that emphasized privacy,
autonomy, and the vindication of civil rights.166 These deontological
rationales are more congruent with democratic principles, principles
the psychotherapist-patient privilege actually serves, as opposed to
paternalistic medical advice.167
II. DETERMINING WHEN THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE IS WAIVED
Privileges belong to the holder, who may assert or waive the
privilege.168 Professional privileges usually belong to the person
receiving professional services (i.e., the client, not the lawyer; the
patient, not the psychotherapist).169 Voluntary disclosures in court or

161. Id. at 19-22.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Id. at 22, 27; see also id. at 22 (“For most of history, men and women have
worked out their difficulties by talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends,
and bartenders.”); cf. id. at 16, 27-28 (“Today social workers provide a significant
amount of mental health treatment. Their clients often include the poor and those of
modest means who could not afford the assistance of a psychiatrist or psychologist,
but whose counseling sessions serve the same public goals.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
164. See generally DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 113 (1987);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions Underlying
the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature on Self-Disclosure, 38
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 707 (2004).
165. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 101 n.130.
166. Id. (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES § 6.2.7, at 507 (2002)).
167. Id. (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES § 6.2.7, at 509-12 (2002)).
168. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.11.
169. Id. Professional providers, however, may claim the privilege for the holder in
court unless the holder has waived the privilege. Id.
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to third parties are universal waivers, but psychotherapists also have
an affirmative duty to disclose patient conversations upon a
reasonable determination that the patient “poses a serious danger of
violence to others.”170 Because this Note only focuses on civil rights
actions brought by incarcerated persons, that duty falls outside the
scope of its analysis. This Part reviews express and implied waivers as
well as exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This Part
focuses specifically on the three approaches to implied waivers:
broad, narrow, and the “middle” view compromise.
A. The General Framework: Express and Implied Waivers and
Privilege Exceptions
Voluntary and knowing conduct on the part of the privilege holder
are the operative components of waiver. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “waive” as “[t]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim,
privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily. []
Ordinarily, to waive a right one must do it knowingly — with
knowledge of the relevant facts.”171 During litigation, privilege
waivers occur when a holder makes a voluntary disclosure or fails to
invoke the privilege.172
Courts recognize two types of waivers: express and implied.173
Express waivers are an “autonomous choice by the holder” and
usually involve signing a release or contract.174 Express waivers have
an “intent” requirement, meaning that the actor must understand the
act and its consequences.175 Implied waivers, on the other hand,
occur when the privilege holder fails to exercise a right or loses a right
based on the holder’s decision “directly related to the right in
question.”176 Privileges are also limited by several exceptions based
on the content of the communication.177 For example, a privilege
never attaches when a patient threatens to harm others (“dangerous
patient exception”),178 commits criminal fraud, or commits a tort.179
170. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1974).
171. Waive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
172. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.4.
173. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 103.
174. Id. at 103-04.
175. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 314 (2003).
176. Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV.
478, 480-84 (1981). But see An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 103 (questioning
the very notion of “implied” waiver).
177. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104.
178. See discussion supra Part I.C. Courts vary on the “dangerous patient
exception.” Compare United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998)
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Courts, however, only consider waiver after a privilege has
attached.180 This Note only considers the scope of implied waivers of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Express waivers are
voluntarily, knowingly, and conclusively waived. This Note considers
whether civil actions brought by incarcerated persons constitute a
voluntary and knowing waiver.
B.

Waiver of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

Because Jaffee recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege for
the defendant in a civil action, the Court did not address the issue of
waiver for a plaintiff’s civil action.181 Further, Jaffee only recognized
that a waiver may occur without specifying under what
circumstances.182
Whether plaintiffs impliedly waive their
psychotherapist-patient privilege often turns on the extent to which
the plaintiff places their mental or emotional state “at issue.”183
Federal courts frequently adopt evidentiary privilege exceptions
identified in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.184 Proposed
Rule 504, in particular, had set out three exceptions to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege: (1) hospitalization proceedings; (2)
court-ordered examinations; and (3) in litigation where the patient’s
mental condition is an element of the claim or defense.185 Exception
three, the “patient-litigant exception,” provides that if a patient places
a sufficient degree of her mental state “in issue,” the adverse party
may discover the patient’s psychotherapy records.186 This is the same
consideration as an implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
This Part reviews the circuit court decisions—and seminal district
court cases—that delineate the scope of the “patient-litigant
exception.”187 Courts either adopt a “broad” view granting total
waiver, a “narrow” view requiring the plaintiff to place privileged
communications in issue, or a “middle” view that preserves the
(recognizing the “dangerous patient exception”), with United States v. Chase, 340
F.3d 978, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding no dangerous patient exception).
179. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996).
183. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 104.
184. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege After Jaffee v.
Redmond: Where Do We Go From Here?, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1341, 1373-74 (1998).
185. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(3) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
186. Poulin, supra note 184, at 1376.
187. Id.
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privilege only for “garden variety” claims of mental or emotional
distress.188
C.

The Majority Rule: “Broad View” on Waiver of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have adopted a
“broad” view as to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.189
The broad view holds that placing one’s mental state at issue, even
through a non-specific claim of damages for mental or emotional
distress, waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege.190 Courts
permit defendants’ requests for privileged material with minimal
review and waive the privilege regardless of the plaintiff’s intention to
call an expert to testify on their mental condition.191 Thus, all
psychotherapist-patient communications are discoverable under the
broad view.192
In 1997, soon after Jaffee, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
adopted the broad view in Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co.193 Sarko
has proven to be a seminal decision for its analysis and subsequent
influence on federal courts.194 In Sarko, the plaintiff sued former
employer-defendant under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).195 Sarko’s employer had fired her for chronic tardiness.196
Sarko, however, alleged that her employer failed to reasonably
accommodate her clinical depression, which required a medication
that made it difficult for the plaintiff to wake up in the morning.197
The Sarko court held that plaintiff placed her mental condition
“directly at issue” through an ADA claim.198 The court identified
three reasons for its decision: (1) pre-Jaffee precedent on waiver; (2)
188. Id.
189. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107; see Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
361 F. App’x 974, 978 (10th Cir. 2010); Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d
815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006);
Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000).
190. See, e.g., Speaker ex rel. Speaker v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d
1105, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
191. Id.; see also An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107.
192. Speaker, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107.
193. Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d,
189 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1999).
194. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 115; Poulin, supra note 184, at
1376 n.165.
195. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 129.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 130.
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similarity to waiver of attorney-client privilege when advice (here,
one’s “mental condition”) is placed at issue; and (3) that fairness and
justice caution against “allowing a plaintiff to hide . . . behind a claim
of privilege.”199 A privilege, the court stated, cannot and should not
be used as a sword to advance litigation as well as a shield to guard
against discoverable evidence.200 Plaintiffs who claim mental or
emotional distress must release all confidential communications
relevant to their mental condition.201
Soon after the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided Sarko, the
Eighth Circuit found Sarko202 and three similar district court
decisions203 persuasive and adopted the broad view of waiver.204 In
Schoffstall v. Henderson, the plaintiff sued the postal service for sex
discrimination, retaliation, and sexual harassment.205 Although
Schoffstall moved for a protective order206 and invoked her
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court denied the motion.207
Schoffstall held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege may be
waived by placing one’s mental condition at issue by claiming
emotional distress.208 Similarly, in 2010, the Tenth Circuit, in Fisher
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., followed Schoffstall’s precise
reasoning in finding that a request for emotional-distress damages
placed one’s psychological state in issue and waived the privilege.209
In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held in Doe v. Oberweis
Dairy that: “If a plaintiff by seeking damages for emotional distress

199. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass. 1997)
(quoting Inserra v. Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A., 1995 WL 54402 (D.N.H. 1995)
(citations omitted) (commenting on attorney-client privilege)).
201. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 230; see also Poulin, supra note 184, at 1377 (“In
Sarko, given the fact that the plaintiff’s claim was founded on a specific medical
condition, proving her claim probably would have required the testimony of her
therapist or of an expert. Thus, a narrow waiver court would likely have reached a
similar result under these facts.”). But see An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at
134 (noting that federal courts are too preoccupied with the definition of disability
and, therefore, require proof that requires a broad waiver of privilege).
202. Sarko, 170 F.R.D. at 130.
203. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 (D.N.J. 2000); Vann v.
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon of Springfield, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (C.D.
Ill. 1997); E.E.O.C. v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
204. Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000).
205. Id. at 821.
206. Id. at 823; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
207. Schoffstall, 223 F.3d at 823.
208. Id. (analogizing to waiver of attorney-client privilege by placing the attorney’s
representation at issue).
209. Fisher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 361 F. App’x 974, 978 (10th Cir. 2010).
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places his or her psychological state in issue, the defendant is entitled
to discover any record of that state.”210 Doe involved a sixteen-yearold part-time ice cream “scooper” who sued her shift supervisor for
sexual harassment that culminated in sexual intercourse.211 The shift
supervisor was prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned for statutory
rape.212 Plaintiff appealed after the district court overruled her
objection to disclosing her psychotherapy records, and upon
disclosure subsequently caused her to limit her claim to emotional
distress.213
Unlike the courts in Jaffee or Schoffstall, Judge Posner analogized
the psychotherapist-patient privilege to the “doctor-patient
privilege.”214 He also employed a balancing provision where the
judge could review plaintiff’s psychiatric records under seal in the
interest of privacy.215 Ironically, there is no federal doctor-patient
privilege (nor is there one in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence), and Jaffee explicitly rejected the balancing test.216 More
concretely, Judge Posner noted that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would entitle the defendant to demand a psychiatric
examination of the plaintiff.217 But Doe’s broad language could also
endorse the “middle” or “garden variety” view, and even the
“narrow” view, depending on the severity of the emotional distress
and how the plaintiff places his or her psychological state in issue.218
Last, the Sixth Circuit has held that any claim for emotional
distress damages waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
putting one’s emotional state at issue.219 In Maday v. Public Libraries
of Saginaw, plaintiff Maday sued for age discrimination after
receiving negative performance reviews and termination from
Saginaw Public Library.220 During the trial, Maday introduced
records from meetings with a social worker as proof of emotional

210. Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2006).
211. Id. at 707.
212. Id. at 707-08 (noting that the age of consent in Illinois rises to eighteen if the
accused holds a “position of trust, authority, or supervision”).
213. Id. at 708.
214. Id. at 718.
215. Id.
216. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996); Helen A. Anderson, The
Psychotherapist Privilege: Privacy and “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 117, 133 n.90 (2013).
217. Doe, 456 F.3d at 718 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 26).
218. Anderson, supra note 216, at 133.
219. Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815, 821 (6th Cir. 2007).
220. Id. at 816-17.

2016] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

939

distress damages.221 Defendant library then introduced additional
conversations between Maday and her social worker about an ongoing disagreement on legal strategy with her attorney as an
alternative cause for her emotional distress.222 On appeal for
admission of privileged information, the Sixth Circuit ignored the fact
that the plaintiff had introduced records from her session with a social
worker.223
Instead of citing Maday’s specific conduct (e.g.,
introducing records), the Sixth Circuit held that seeking emotionaldistress damages puts one’s emotional state at issue and waives the
privilege.224
D. The Minority Rule: “Narrow View” Preserving the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
The Second and D.C. Circuits have adopted a narrower approach
to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.225 The “narrow”
view declines to find a waiver unless the plaintiff affirmatively places
privileged communications in issue or lists her psychotherapist as a
witness for trial.226 The narrow waiver closely parallels the attorneyclient privilege227—as articulated in Jaffee228—and does not reach
claims for emotional damages.229
Soon after Sarko, Massachusetts’s district court rejected the broad
view and, instead, affirmed Jaffee’s proscription against balancing
privacy and the need for evidence.230 In Vanderbilt v. Town of
Chilmark, plaintiff Vanderbilt had alleged gender discrimination and
retaliation against defendant Town of Chilmark, and claimed
emotional damages.231 The court denied Chilmark’s motion to
compel discovery of Vanderbilt’s therapeutic records and to depose
her therapist.232 Vanderbilt held that waiver only occurs when the
patient: (1) explicitly waives it; (2) discloses privileged material; or (3)

221. Id. at 820.
222. Id. at 820-21.
223. Id. at 820.
224. Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
225. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 117 (2d Cir. 2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d
384, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
226. An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 107.
227. See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997).
228. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
229. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1381-82.
230. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229.
231. Id. at 225.
232. Id. at 230.
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uses privileged material as evidence to support a claim or defense.233
Otherwise, the substance of psychiatric care, counseling, and therapy
would remain privileged.234
For example, in the context of attorney-client privilege, a plaintiff
waives the privilege when using attorney advice as a defense or suing
an attorney for malpractice.235 A claim for attorney’s fees, however,
does not waive the privilege.236 In Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, the
Northern District of Illinois adopted a similar rationale.237 In Hucko,
plaintiff filed an excessive force and misconduct claim against the city
and its police officers under Section 1983.238 Hucko held that the
plaintiff had not impliedly waived his psychotherapist-patient
privilege by merely seeking damages for humiliation, emotional
distress, and pain and suffering.239 Although a plaintiff may waive the
privilege by calling an independent expert or presenting evidence of a
past psychotherapy consultation to bolster a claim for emotional
distress, the plaintiff did not intend to offer medical testimony and did
not place his diagnosis or treatment at issue.240
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit found Vanderbilt’s reasoning and analogy
to attorney-client privilege more persuasive than the broad view
decisions of the Seventh and Eight Circuits.241 In Koch v. Cox,
plaintiff Koch sued his employer, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), alleging discrimination, retaliation, and failure to
accommodate his medical condition.242
Although Koch
acknowledged that he suffered from depression during discovery, he

233. Id. at 228.
234. Id.; see also McDonnell, supra 21, at 1382.
235. Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 229.
236. Id.
237. Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 529 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“[T]he
principles governing implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege should apply in
determining what is sufficient to constitute an implied waiver of the psychotherapistpatient privilege.”) (citing Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1175 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1995); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851 (3d Cir.
1984)).
238. Hucko, 185 F.R.D. at 527.
239. Id. However, the plaintiff impliedly waived his psychotherapist-patient
privilege for maintaining that “preoccupation” with treatment or the effects of
various medications were the reason why he failed to file suit within the applicable
statutory limitations. Id.
240. Id. at 529.
241. Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distinguishing Doe v.
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2006); Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818,
823 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 80.
242. Koch, 489 F.3d at 386.
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had not claimed emotional distress damages.243 During discovery, the
SEC sought Koch’s psychotherapy records because he “had put his
mental state in issue and thereby waived the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.”244
The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the broad view of waiver is a
standard that sub silentio overrules Jaffee by eviscerating the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.245 Waiving the privilege for any
party involved in litigation with a mental element—who just so
happens to have received psychotherapy in the past—would
eviscerate that privilege.246 Waiver does not occur when a plaintiff
acknowledges that he or she suffers from depression.247 Nor may a
defendant place the plaintiff’s mental state in issue and overcome the
privilege.248 Waiver, therefore, should only occur in circumstances
similar to waiver of the attorney-client privilege: when a plaintiff
bases a claim on communication with his psychotherapist or
selectively uses such communication to gain an advantage in
litigation.249
The Second Circuit agreed with Koch.250 In In re Sims, the court
held that a broad view of waiver would effectively eviscerate the
psychotherapist-patient privilege and overrule Jaffee.251 In Sims, the
Second Circuit reversed a trial court order to disclose plaintiff’s
psychiatric records in an excessive force case brought by an
incarcerated person against two correctional officers.252 Although
Sims had withdrawn his claim for emotional distress damages,253
defendants sought Sim’s mental health records to impeach his
Defendants actually argued that Sims’s
credibility at trial.254
excessive force claim raised the question of whether Sims started the
fight “due to uncontrolled aggression, a persecution complex, or some
243. Id. at 389.
244. Id. at 387.
245. Id. at 390.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 391.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 390-91 (citations omitted).
250. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 141.
253. Id. at 120, 125, 134 (indicating that the incident occurred at New York’s Sing
Sing Correctional Facility and implicated correctional officers Mike Blot and
Francisco Caraballo for assault without provocation or justification).
254. Id. at 126. Defendants sought to undermine Sims’ claim that Blot’s attack was
unprovoked because his “psychiatric records might show that he had masochistic or
suicidal tendencies.” Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
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other psychological problem.”255 The Second Circuit summarily
rejected this argument because starting a fight has no bearing on
whether “Sims was motivated by such a mental condition.”256
As the Second Circuit reasoned, Sims had claimed physical injuries
not serious emotional injuries.257 In fact, Sims only testified to
dreaming about the assault and becoming anxious upon seeing a
corrections officer holding a knife.258 He did not claim to suffer
mental injuries, nor did he claim to receive treatment for any mental
or emotional injuries.259 The court noted that merely stating that one
suffers from depression or anxiety does not waive the privilege, nor,
can an opposing party place one’s mental state “in issue” based on
this information.260 Only by disclosing or introducing some privileged
material would a party waive the privilege.261 In sum, Sims had not
used privileged material as a “sword” to advance litigation while
simultaneously trying to “shield” privileged communications from
scrutiny.262
E. The Compromise: A “Middle View” that Preserves the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege for “Garden Variety” Claims of
Emotional Distress
Both the broad view and narrow view agree that calling a mental
health professional as an expert witness would constitute a waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.263 The distinction between the
two views turns on claims for emotional distress damages.264
Plaintiffs that claim only emotional distress damages need not
produce an expert or introduce their mental health records.265 A
party can prove emotional distress damages through its own

255. Id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 134 (quoting Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
261. Id. at 132.
262. Id. at 138 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 187 (2d Cir.
2000)).
263. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1386.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1387; see also Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The
Developing Scope of Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LITIG.
1, 25 (2000).
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testimony, and an opposing party may then depose the testifying
party during discovery.266
As a result, several courts have differentiated claims of “garden
variety emotional distress” from claims of mental injury or “serious”
emotional distress.267 Seven years before Jaffee, in a civil rights case
alleging racial discrimination, the District Court of Massachusetts
recognized that claiming “garden variety” emotional distress does not
place one’s mental condition at issue in litigation.268 In Sabree v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Sabree, the plaintiff,
alleged that a union unlawfully denied him membership because of
his race.269 Sabree sought damages for lost wages and emotional
distress.270 When the union requested Sabree’s psychotherapy
records, Sabree asserted his psychotherapist-patient privilege.271
The Sabree court employed a four-pronged test to determine
whether the court should recognize or disclose the evidentiary
privilege: (1) Would courts recognize such a privilege?; (2) Is the
asserted privilege “intrinsically meritorious”?; (3) Should such a
privilege be actively fostered?; and (4) would disclosure injure the
relationship more than benefit the court proceeding?272 The Sabree
court found that all four-prongs had been met to preserve the
privilege: Massachusetts recognized the psychotherapist privilege to
foster treatment and advance society’s mental health.273 Further, the
court found that Sabree’s privacy interest “overwhelmingly”
outweighed any benefit to the defendant-Union, and the records at
issue were “perspicuously irrelevant to the instant lawsuit.”274 The
court concluded by asserting that no exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege applies because Sabree had claimed “garden variety”
emotional distress, not psychological injuries and psychiatric
disorders, as damages.275
Similarly, in Johnson v. Trujillo, the plaintiff brought a personal
injury suit after a motor vehicle accident with Trujillo, the
266. See Nelken, supra note 265, at 25.
267. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 112; Kent & Kent, supra note
21, at 480.
268. Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126
F.R.D. 422, 426 (D. Mass. 1989).
269. See id. at 423.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 425 (citing In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1981)).
273. Id. at 425-26.
274. Id. at 426.
275. Id.
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defendant.276 During her deposition, Johnson described the fallout
from the accident to be “very upsetting” and “extremely emotional
and scary.”277 She also expressed concern about having to undergo
future surgery.278 Trujillo then sought Johnson’s psychiatric and
marriage-counseling records because she had “injected her mental
condition into the case” and claimed more than ordinary damages.279
The Johnson court held that “bare allegations of mental anguish,
emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life”
did not place plaintiff’s mental condition at issue.280 Only placing the
specific mental or emotional condition at issue would contravene
fairness and justice.281 If Johnson had called her psychiatrist as a
witness to further a damages claim, the court would have ruled
differently.282 In such a situation, the privilege would become a sword
to advance the plaintiff’s litigation.
Courts tend to find psychiatric diagnoses or treatment as moving
beyond the realm of “garden variety” emotional distress.283 Yet,
diagnoses and treatment reveal little about an individual’s conscious
subjective sensation of an emotional injury.284 But anything beyond
subjective sensation, such as producing records to support a severity
claim, would require mental health records or expert testimony that
would waive the privilege.285
Still, the District of New Jersey has held that claiming emotional
distress while pursuing or continuing to receive psychotherapy waives
the privilege.286 In Jackson v. Chubb Corp., the District Court for the
District of New Jersey considered a protective order to prevent
discovery of plaintiff’’s mental health records after plaintiff sued her
former-employer for race discrimination.287 Jackson not only wanted
to vindicate her rights, but also needed to receive mental health

276. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 153 (Colo. 1999).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 154.
280. Id. at 157.
281. See Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
282. Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157 n.5.
283. Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 557 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
(collecting cases).
284. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 113.
285. See id. at 113 n.205.
286. Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 226 (D.N.J. 2000).
287. See id. at 217.
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treatment because she had been diagnosed as seriously depressed and
had experienced hallucinations in the past.288
After assessing the case law supporting the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, Jackson criticized the narrow view of waiver for failing to
reconcile its position with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a)
(Rule 35(a)), which permits courts to order a mental examination
when a plaintiff places her mental condition at issue.289 Because
mandated psychiatric exams are no less intrusive than disclosing
treatment records, the Jackson court held that failure to question
Rule 35(a)’s fairness of the “at issue” rule made fairness in
consideration of waiver insignificant.290 Jackson, therefore, held that
the broad view of waiver best serves party interests and adequately
addresses fairness issues considered in other courts.291
The Jackson court, however, carved out claims of “garden variety”
emotional distress from claims that place a mental condition at issue
because it does not satisfy Rule 35(a)’s requirement that the “mental
condition” must be “in controversy.”292 Several courts have held that
mental anguish or “garden variety” emotional distress does not place
plaintiff’s mental condition in controversy.293 Although the Jackson
court recognized the Hobson’s choice between unfettered
psychotherapy and a plaintiff’s right to pursue litigation, the court
found it more inequitable to bar a defendant from gathering
To preserve the privilege and prevent
necessary evidence.294
disclosure, plaintiffs must abandon or limit their claims to “garden
variety” emotional distress, regardless of the actual damage
incurred.295
288. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)).
289. Id. at 222, 225 n.8; FED R. CIV. P. 35 (“Mental Health Examination:” (1)
plaintiff asserted a specific cause of action for intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress; (2) plaintiff has alleged specific mental/psychiatric injury or
disorder; (3) plaintiff claimed severe emotional distress; (4) plaintiff offered expert
testimony in support of emotional distress damages; and (5) plaintiff concedes mental
condition is “in controversy.”); see also Fitzgerald v. Cassil, 216 F.R.D. 632, 636-38
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (analogizing to FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a) in adopting the “middle” view
of waiver).
290. Jackson, 193 F.R.D. at 222.
291. Id. at 224.
292. Id. at 225 n.8 (citing Smith v. J.I. Case Corp., 163 F.R.D. 229, 231 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89, 97 (S.D. Cal. 1995); Bridges v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)); see also Stevenson v.
Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
293. See Stevenson, 201 F.R.D. at 553 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (citations omitted)
(collecting cases).
294. Jackson, 193 F.R.D. at 226.
295. Id. at 227.
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English dictionaries define “garden variety” as “[o]rdinary,
common, or unexceptional.”296 “Garden variety” emotional distress
is a legal—not medical term—that gives judges considerable
discretion to decide what falls within its scope.297 The District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois defined “garden variety”
emotional damages in Santelli v. Electro-Motive as “negative
emotions that [a plaintiff] experienced as the intrinsic result of
defendant’s alleged conduct, [such as] humiliation, embarrassment,
and other similar emotions.”298 However, “garden variety” emotions
do not include “any resulting symptoms or conditions that [one]
might have suffered, [including] sleeplessness, nervousness, [and]
depression.”299 The Santelli court cites no legal or scientific authority
for excluding sleeplessness, nervousness, and depression.300 In fact,
judicial discretion is so wide and varied that some courts have ordered
magistrate judges to conduct in camera reviews of medical records
before determining the scope and extent of permissible emotional
distress claims.301
More recently, in Flowers v. Owens, the Northern District of
Illinois considered whether persistent fear, anxiety, and depression
about leaving the house (i.e., subtle agoraphobia) qualified as
“garden variety” emotional distress.302 Flowers, the plaintiff, sued
Will County Correctional Facility after being detained and beaten in
custody.303 After the incident, Flowers feared retaliation from law
enforcement, especially the people involved in the case.304 The
Flowers court held that the plaintiff could testify generally about
“humiliation, embarrassment, anger, and feeling depressed, anxious
and dejected,” but could not testify about resulting symptoms or
persistent conditions and maintain the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.305
Flowers could not testify that he feared retaliation, leaving home,
or thinking about the incident every day because these symptoms are

296. Garden Variety, WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/garden_variety
[https://perma.cc/7PZP-E5G3].
297. See An Uncertain Privilege, supra note 21, at 112.
298. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
299. Id. at 309.
300. Id.
301. See Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 570 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The in
camera review process, however, undermines the entire purpose of a privilege.
302. Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 221 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
303. Id. at 220-21.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 227.
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indicative of agoraphobia or PTSD.306
As the court noted,
agoraphobia and PTSD are disorders classifiable in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), not “garden
variety” emotional distress.307 The Flowers court thus reaffirmed the
Jackson court’s reading that even a description of “garden variety”
emotional distress symptoms overcomes the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.308 Emotional distress, therefore, must not reach beyond the
purely subjective and most general-description of an emotional
response to a civil wrong.
III. THE SCOPE OF WAIVER IN PRISON LITIGATION: DAMAGES,
FAIRNESS, AND MOVING BEYOND “GARDEN VARIETY”
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Part III of this Note analyzes the broad, narrow, and middle views
on waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege through legal,
policy, and normative frameworks. Tort law principles, fairness in
litigation, confidentiality in guarding against social stigma, and the
context of incarceration all militate in favor of the narrow approach
to waiver. This Part argues against the “broad” view and critiques the
growing “middle” view of the psychotherapist-patient waiver. In
particular, the “garden variety” approach to waiver takes the
psychotherapist-patient privilege out of the holder’s hands and places
it within the judge’s vision of “normal” emotions.309 This Note
concludes that in the context of prison litigation, imposing “garden
variety” or “normative” limits on emotional distress—such as those
experienced by an imagined “healthy, well-adjusted person”—is
biased, unrealistic, and discriminatory against incarcerated persons.
A. Damages: The “Eggshell-Plaintiff” Rule and Apportionment
Legal causation provides attorneys with creative avenues to argue
for or against admissible evidence.310 Civil defendants frequently
offer evidence of an alternative factual cause to a plaintiff’s injuries to
avoid or mitigate liability.311 Alternative causes also require findings

306. Id. But see id. at 228 (“This is not to say that Mr. Flowers is suffering from
agoraphobia or PTSD. Mr. Flowers makes no such claim, and only a qualified
medical professional can make that diagnosis.”).
307. See id.
308. See Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 223 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing Santelli
v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999)).
309. See generally Anderson, supra note 216, at 120.
310. See Smith, supra note 17, at 760.
311. Id.
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on the “apportionment” of the injury caused by a defendant’s
actions.312 For civil rights plaintiffs that claim mental or emotional
injuries, defendants frequently pursue alternative causation theories
centered on the plaintiff’s mental health history. It is important to
note, however, that causation is different from valuating the harm of
an injury—that is, damages.313 Moreover, the subjective nature of
mental or emotional injuries makes apportionment of the injury
nearly impossible to calculate.314 If a court attempted to apportion a
mental or emotional injury based on a plaintiff’s mental health
history, it would only engage in ungrounded speculation.
Tort law relies on the “eggshell-skull plaintiff” rule to guide courts
in valuating damages for plaintiffs with preexisting conditions.315
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the “eggshell-skull plaintiff” as “[a]
plaintiff whose physical or mental condition makes the person
exceptionally vulnerable to injury.”316 Tortfeasors must take their
victim as they find them regardless of susceptibility. Defendants,
therefore, are liable for damages that exacerbate the plaintiff’s
preexisting condition; not what is expected to happen to the “ordinary
person.”317 Furthermore, defendants may only apportion damages to
other causes when harms are distinct or reasonably divisible.318
Otherwise, the harm is “indivisible” when no logical division is
apparent.319 Mental or emotional states, injuries, or distress are often
context-dependent and vary considerably over time. By the very
nature of mental and emotional states, it is near impossible to
apportion a single cause to a subjective condition, especially for a
third-party fact finder.320 Courts, however, still allow attenuated
speculation into a mental or emotional injury: if the plaintiff had not
suffered anxiety, depression, or insomnia, the mental or emotional
injury would have never occurred.321 But a plaintiff’s preexisting
condition or past experience with anxiety, depression, or insomnia
does not automatically relate to a similar response proximately
caused by a civil rights violation.

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.
See id. at 762.
See generally id.
See Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000).
Eggshell-Skull Plaintiff, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Smith, supra note 17, at 761.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A(1)(a)-(b) (1965).
Id. §§ 433A(2), 433A cmt. i.
See Smith, supra note 17, at 787.

See id.
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For claims of mental or emotional injury in prison, the “eggshellskull plaintiff” rule is significant because the experience of
incarceration involves coercive arrest, the loss of privacy, and
exposure to violence in correctional institutions.322 Many prisoners
experience PTSD, panic attacks, depression, paranoia, and a sense of
helplessness from these highly stressful and traumatic events.323
Furthermore, civil rights violations carry their own incumbent mental
or emotional injuries.324 Life-altering fear, anxieties, trauma, and
accompanying physical symptoms, such as insomnia and indigestion,
are all common.325 As a consequence of history and context,
incarcerated persons are more susceptible to preexisting conditions
and aggravated mental or emotional injuries subsequent to a civil
rights violation.326 Because tortfeasors must take their victim as they
exist in this particularized context, they are responsible for the
exacerbation of damages claimed by the victim regardless of his or
her past mental health history.327 A civil defendant that attempts to
mitigate damages based on past mental health treatment moves
beyond the valuation of damages.328
Yet, the broad approach to waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege permits defendants to plumb the plaintiff’s entire mental
health history to mitigate damages and explore alternative theories of
causation.329 Broad view courts posit that claims of mental or
emotional injury create a legal matter “at issue.”330 When courts
grant a broad waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, they
usurp the plaintiff-privilege holder’s right to decide whether or not to
put forward his preexisting condition. In fact, broad waivers provide

322. See generally DeVeaux, supra note 66 (commenting on academic literature
detailing the psychological and traumatic experience of incarceration from the
perspective of a formerly incarcerated person).
323. Id. at 259.
324. From words to violence, civil rights violations have profound psychological
effects. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135 (1982); see also
Anderson, supra note 216, at 126 (“Victims . . . often endure terrible humiliation,
pain and suffering. This distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders and
medical problems.”).
325. See Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 221-22 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
326. See generally DeVeaux, supra note 66.
327. See Smith, supra note 17, at 760-61.
328. Id. at 769.
329. See discussion supra Part II.C.
330. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2006).
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the defense with irrelevant and, sometimes, stigmatizing
information.331
The middle view of waiver more appropriately adopts tort
principles by excluding claims for “garden variety” emotional distress.
Underlying psychological conditions are irrelevant when considering
a plaintiff’s emotional response to a civil rights violation. But the
middle view discounts the traumatic experience of incarceration and
civil rights violations.332 It ignores personal histories of abuse, racial
discrimination, poverty, oppression, and the on-going invasion of
privacy and identity reconstruction taking place in prison.333 The
middle view, therefore, is insufficient.
In the context of prison litigation, the narrow view of waiver proves
most reasonable. The narrow view mirrors the attorney-client
privilege by keeping the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the
privilege holder’s hands.334 If the plaintiff makes a claim for
exacerbated injuries through proof of a preexisting condition, the
plaintiff may voluntarily waive his privilege to introduce relevant
evidence. Once a plaintiff proves his preexisting condition, the
“eggshell-skull plaintiff” rule would hold a defendant liable for the
damages proximately caused by their wrong. Moreover, the privilege
stops defendants from engaging in attenuated speculation into
alternative causes of a mental or emotional injury. Ultimately, the
narrow approach prevents defendants from grafting past subjective
states onto the present injury litigated in court.
B. Fairness: Truth-Seeking, Vindicating Prisoner Rights, and
Confidentiality as a Means to Guard Against the Stigma of Mental
Illness
To effectuate justice and protect individual rights, courts must
objectively weigh evidence and provide litigants with a fair hearing.
Courts consider fairness to parties in litigation when deciding whether
to admit or exclude evidence, including whether to invoke a broad,
narrow, or middle approach to the scope of the waiver.335 This Part

331. Smith, supra note 17, at 786.
332. See supra Part II.E.
333. See generally DeVeaux, supra note 67, at 260-63 (describing verbal abuse, the
historical and cultural trauma of slavery and life in a race-conscious society, and
identity loss and reconstruction).
334. See Vanderbilt v. Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 229 (D. Mass. 1997).
335. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 224 (D.N.J.
2000); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d,
189 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1999).
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conducts a three-pronged analysis of fairness considerations for the
implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege: (1) truthseeking in discovery; (2) not chilling civil rights actions; and (3)
preserving confidential information that may be used to impeach,
discredit, and stigmatize the plaintiff. Although the broad view of
waiver would expand the domain of potentially admissible evidence,
the narrow view of waiver promotes important social policies
consonant with the goals of evidentiary privileges.

1.

Truth-Seeking During Discovery

Evidentiary privileges are not favored in the justice system.336 By
their nature, they obstruct the revelation of probative evidence.337 As
the institution of justice, courts demand “every man’s evidence in
search for the truth.”338 However, as the Jaffee court recognized, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was a “public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.”339 Fairness reenters the court as a consideration
when waiver of the privilege becomes an issue in litigation. Because
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is an evidentiary privilege,
courts tend to strictly construe the privilege and favor arguments for
its waiver.340 The fairness argument, however, must be more than the
potential to exclude relevant evidence.341 Courts characterize the
fairness consideration as proscribing the use of the privilege “as a
sword instead of a shield.”342
In Johnson v. Trujilo, the court’s fairness assessment of waiver
supported the “middle view” approach.343 Johnson had claimed
“garden variety” emotional damages incident to physical injuries—
injuries unrelated to a specific mental or emotional condition at
issue.344 However, courts that employ the broad view of waiver find

336. See supra Part I.D; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51
(1980).
337. Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health Provider Privilege in the Wake of
Jaffee v. Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 591, 593 (2001).
338. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
339. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
340. See Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
341. Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (1999).
342. Id. Some courts also express concern about the psychotherapist-patient
privilege being used as both a sword and shield. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Town of
Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (1997) (citing Inserra v. Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A.,
No. CIV. 94-454-M, 1995 WL 54402 (D.N.H. 1995)).
343. See supra Part II.E.
344. Johnson, 977 P.2d at 157.
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any assertion of mental or emotional distress operates as a “sword” to
advance a claim or defense while, simultaneously, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege “shields” the opposing party from
reviewing the evidence supporting the claim or defense.345 These
courts are highly skeptical of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
and find that nearly all confidential information falls within an
expansive category of mental or emotional injuries. Broad view
courts find all psychotherapist-patient communication relevant and
helpful to defendants without distinguishing the scope, extent, or type
of a mental or emotional distress claim made by a plaintiff.346
Under the “broad” view, fairness for civil rights defendants is the
primary concern. Broad view courts hold that it would be unfair to
deny the defendant an opportunity to inquire into the plaintiff’s past
“to show alternative causes for her emotional distress.”347 The broad
view fails on two levels: (1) its fairness argument rests on an
inactionable relevance argument, and (2) it runs counter to the overarching principle of privileges to serve more important social
interests.348 Moreover, courts that engage in a fairness analysis to
overcome the psychotherapist-patient privilege ostensibly eviscerate
the privilege and violate Jaffee’s holding.349
Narrow view courts, on the other hand, would avoid this tendency
to favor defendant requests for privileged material. Because narrow
waiver courts distinguish the type, extent, and scope of a mental or
emotional distress claim, only claims that affirmatively place a specific
condition at issue would waive the privilege.350 Further, a mental or
emotional injury “in issue” should directly relate to proximate or
concurrent mental illness, and not “alternative stressors” such as
divorce or financial stress.351

2.

Vindicating the Rights of the Incarcerated

Evidentiary privileges are manifestations of “extrinsic social
policy.”352 They place certain values and social relationships above

345. See, e.g., Vanderbilt, 174 F.R.D. at 230.
346. See Sidor v. Reno, No. 95 Civ. 9588, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4593, at *4-7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
347. See id. at *4-5.
348. See McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1384.
349. Id. at 1384-85.
350. Id. at 1379.
351. Smith, supra note 17, at 787.
352. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 106, § 5.2.
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judicial truth-seeking and efficiency.353 As described in Part I.D of
this Note, privileges safeguard one’s privacy, freedom, and
interpersonal trust, especially in certain professional relationships.354
In a democratic society that values individual rights, these are all
public goods of “transcendent importance.”
The psychotherapist-patient privilege belongs to the privilege
holder.355 As such, fairness analysis should focus on how waiver
affects the privilege holder. Notably, broad views on waiver
effectively chill civil rights litigation, especially for vulnerable
populations who may have received mental health treatment in the
past. Under the broad view, courts force victims of mental or
emotional injury to make a Hobson’s choice: pursue litigation and
waive the privilege or do not pursue litigation at all.356 Such an
approach undermines federal civil rights policy, which seeks to
vindicate civil rights by making plaintiffs “private attorneys
general.”357 Vindicating civil rights in corrections redresses acts of
violence and discrimination so that society at-large, and conduct in
correctional institutions, might benefit.358
The middle and narrow views of waiver fall within the letter and
spirit of Jaffee.
Courts should not review waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege through balancing privacy interests
and fairness in litigation; nor should the privilege be waived
automatically upon filing a civil rights suit that alleges mental or
emotional distress.359 First, erosion of the privilege is not the only
way to find the truth.360 Defendants may inquire into the past and
posit alternative theories of causation independent of mental health
records. Second, Jaffee effectively prohibited balancing access to
evidence against the privilege to prevent courts from moving the
privilege from the hands of the holder to the judge.361 Third, for the
middle view, non-specific emotional distress is within a layperson’s
sphere of knowledge.362 Plaintiffs may testify as to their emotional

353. See id.
354. Id.
355. Id. § 5.11.
356. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1385-86.
357. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (noting that
private attorneys general vindicate Congressional policy of the highest priority).
358. Anderson, supra note 216, at 145.
359. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1386.
360. See Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 531 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
361. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996).
362. McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1386.
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distress without an expert witness to detail the substance of
psychotherapy.363
Finally, Jaffee expressed a concern with chilling psychotherapistpatient communications in the absence of a reliable privilege.364
Therapists and patients would speak with reservation if the prospect
of litigation loomed. But discussing the “restricted issue” may be the
most important aspect of improving a patient’s mental health.365
Moreover, plaintiffs interested in maintaining their privacy may forgo
an emotional distress claim. Even under the middle view, plaintiffs
may severely limit their emotional distress claim to preserve their
psychotherapist-patient privilege.366
Coupled with the PLRA’s
limitations,367 the broad waiver may effectively foreclose an
incarcerated person’s redress for mental or emotional injury
subsequent to a civil rights violation.

3.

Confidentiality to Guard Against Stigma

Jaffee’s recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege sought
to foster uninhibited communication during mental health treatment
through the certainty of confidentiality. Privileging communication in
a treatment relationship also protects against the emotional upheaval
attendant to public revelation of certain information.368 There are
two harms inherent to revealing a patient’s confidential information:
(1) making public highly personal information, and (2) the stigma that
attaches to diagnoses of certain mental health conditions. Unlike the
broad and middle views of waiver, the narrow approach would guard
against the negative social consequences attendant to past behavior or
medical conditions.
The stigma that attaches to mental illness grows out of normative
“sanism” in society and the legal system, which segregates and
discriminates against people with mental illness, constructing them in
the public consciousness as “shameful, dangerous, and
irresponsible.”369 It is ironic that the Federal Rules of Evidence
exclude other stigmatizing information, such as character, criminal

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12.
McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1388.
See id. (citing Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999)).
See supra Part I.C.
McDonnell, supra note 21, at 1389.
Stefan, supra note 34, at 136, 145. See also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN

PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21-24, 39-43 (2000) (describing “sanism”).
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behavior, or sexual behavior,370 but not a plaintiff’s disability. As a
result, defendants in civil rights actions have used evidence of a
plaintiff’s psychiatric diagnosis or treatment to discredit their claim
and testimony.371
For example, in the context of prison litigation, mental health
status frequently comes in to discredit a plaintiff’s testimony.372
When the plaintiff and other incarcerated persons are the only
witnesses to a civil rights violation, correctional officers use mental
health records to undermine the accuracy of their perception of
events.373
Although witnesses are given a presumption of
competency, mental disabilities are broadly construed by the public to
represent an incapacity to recall events accurately.374 Fact-finders
may “draw inappropriate and prejudicial inferences regarding [a]
plaintiff’s character and credibility” because American society
continues to stigmatize mental illness as well as past criminal
conduct.375
Unlike most medical diagnoses, mental illness does not evoke
“empathic” responses.376 Erving Goffman’s classic study of stigma
placed the problem succinctly as a discrediting, dehumanizing, and
Stigma profoundly impacts civil
disempowering attribute.377
litigation; it may end a civil rights claim entirely, because the factfinder often rules on the credibility of the plaintiff.378 Moreover, fact
finders may give inappropriate weight to evidence of mental illness to
reach conclusions on events, motives, causation, and damages.379
Plaintiffs may also face issues collateral to trial, including social
alienation and employment discrimination.

370. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 412 (2014).
371. Smith, supra note 17, at 751.
372. See, e.g., In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008).
373. See Smith, supra note 17, at 788.
374. See id. at 790 (citing United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
1950) (discussing criminal defendants use of mental illness to generate reasonable
doubt)) (noting that the “value of psychiatry” to court proceedings came to be
recognized only during the decades just prior to the decision).
375. Smith, supra note 17, at 808.
376. Id. at 809. People often construe one’s subjective experience as wholly in
control of the person, as opposed to a physical injury or disease. Id. The rationale of
individual control over one’s mental condition results in blaming responses to a
mental health diagnosis. Id. Even less severe forms of mental illness incur the same
stigma. Id.
377. Id. (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963)).
378. Smith, supra note 17, at 809.
379. See generally id.
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Similar concerns about confidentiality and privacy arose in the
1980s and 1990s for people living with HIV.380 Since the very start of
the epidemic, HIV-positive individuals have faced employment
discrimination and social alienation.381 Many feared that a positive
test result would be made public.382 As a result, states passed strict
confidentiality protections to avoid discrimination and encourage
testing.383 With mental illness, confidentiality protections would
provide a bulwark against discrimination, encourage treatment, and
allow victims of civil rights violations to bring lawsuits without the
emotional upheaval of a publicly stigmatizing trial.
C.

Critique of “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress

In Kunstler v. City of New York, the Southern District of New
York defined “garden variety” emotional distress as “the distress that
any healthy, well-adjusted person would likely feel as a result of being
so victimized [by a civil rights violation].”384 Evidence demonstrative
of “garden variety” emotional distress includes the plaintiff’s
testimony that they felt isolated, hurt, shocked, sad, worried,
embarrassed, or humiliated.385 Psychic injury, the step beyond the
“garden variety” would include symptoms indicative of PTSD or
depression, such as heart palpitations, insomnia, agoraphobia, or
indigestion.386 Courts also consider a plaintiff’s conduct outside of
court to render determinations as to whether an injury is psychiatric
or “garden variety” emotional distress. Courts consider seeking
psychotherapy after the incident as indicative of psychic injury.387

380. See generally Hannah R. Fishman, Comment, HIV Confidentiality and
Stigma: A Way Forward, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 199, 201 (2013).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. Fishman also considers whether confidentiality actually contributes to

stigma rather than mitigates it.
384. Kunstler v. City of New York, No. 04CIV1145(RWS)(MHD), 2006 WL
2516625, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006). See Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 225
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (collecting cases). For a discussion of the “garden variety”
compromise see supra Part II.E.
385. Michael L. Orenstein, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 20 TOURO L.
REV. 679, 698-701 (2004).
386. See id.
387. See also Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216 (D.N.J. 2000). See generally
Orenstein, supra note 385.

2016] PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
1.

957

Inconsistency Among Courts in Interpreting the Scope of Waiver

The “garden variety” approach has no genus or species. It is often
inconsistent.388 For example, in In re RNC Consolidated Cases, the
Southern District of New York summarily decided all plaintiff claims
for mental or emotional injuries went beyond “garden variety”
emotional damages.389 The court did not bother distinguishing
“‘mental injury,’ ‘emotional injuries,’ ‘severe emotional distress,’
‘embarrassment, humiliation, shock, fright,’ ‘mental anguish,’ and
‘apprehension.’”390 The court also summarily ignored cases that have
recognized similar claims of emotional distress and preserved the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.391 Furthermore, the court read In
re Sims as authoritative support for its “garden variety” analysis, even
though Sims recognized a narrow approach to waiver.392
Similar inconsistencies have arisen in the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits. After the Doe and Schoffstall courts embraced the broad
approach to waiver, subsequent district court decisions have
embraced the “garden variety” view.393 Inconsistency arises when the
court finds a mental condition “at issue.”394 Thus, the “broad” view
and “middle” view can co-exist because “garden variety” emotional
distress may not put a mental condition “at issue.” However, district
courts are still at liberty to decide which emotional responses place a
mental condition “at issue” and waive the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. Circuit courts and district courts offer little guidance or
predictability on waiver. These courts also fail to provide any
consistent approach to placing a mental condition “at issue” or what
constitutes “garden variety” emotional distress. Although judges
have defined “garden variety” emotional distress,395 in practice the
term has proven indeterminate and elastic.396

388. See Anderson, supra note 216, at 129.
389. In re RNC Consol. Cases, 2009 WL 130178, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009).
390. Id.
391. See generally Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 529 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
392. In re RNC Consol. Cases, 2009 WL 130178, at *5-7. Cf. In re Sims, 534 F.3d
117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
393. Anderson, supra note 216, at 130 n.87 (citations omitted). See generally Flowers
v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 226 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
394. See Anderson, supra note 216, at 130 n.87.
395. See Orenstein, supra note 385, at 698-701.
396. Anderson, supra note 216, at 138-39 (listing definitions).
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Discriminatory Impact

Although seemingly a fair compromise, the “garden variety”
approach actively discriminates against persons with mental illness.
Most obviously, the “garden variety” approach privileges patients
who never sought psychotherapy.397 Civil rights plaintiffs without
mental health records are free to file claims for mental or emotional
injuries because they have nothing to waive or disclose. But plaintiffs
who have sought psychotherapy in the past may only claim “garden
variety” emotional distress unless they are willing to disclose their
entire mental health history to the defendant.
More importantly, the “garden variety” approach only protects
plaintiffs whose mental or emotional suffering appears “normal” and
“ordinary” to the district court judge.398 When judges refer to
“garden variety” emotional distress, they envision what a
decontextualized ordinary person would experience.399 But who is
the reasonably emotionally distressed person? And do gender, race,
and incarceration factor into the judge’s consideration?400
Because most judges and lawyers come from privileged
backgrounds,401 they should not predetermine a plaintiff’s emotional
response to civil rights violations, especially for protected classes that
have experienced discrimination in the past.402 Incarcerated persons,
in particular, have disproportionately experienced racial
discrimination, poverty, oppression, and the ongoing invasion of
privacy and identity reconstruction in prison.403 Any concept that
accounts for “normal” mental or emotional distress must account for
the accumulated experiences of discrimination and oppression.404
But, far too often, the decontextualized ordinary person bears the
standard. As a result, “garden variety” emotional distress effectively

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Id. at 140.
See id.
Id.
Id.

Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 407 (2000).
402. Anderson, supra note 216, at 140.
403. Compare the experiences of women who have experienced a history of gender
discrimination and sexual harassment. What would qualify as “garden variety”
emotional distress for hostile workplace claims considering this historical trauma?
Does “garden variety” emotional distress, then, account for history or jettison lived
experience for a “normal” legal subject?
404. Anderson, supra note 216, at 140.
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tells civil rights plaintiffs that something is wrong with them when
they suffer more than the “reasonable dominant group.”405
“Garden variety” emotional distress also discriminates against
persons with mental illness or emotional problems. It perpetuates the
stigma of mental illness by placing a person beyond “normal” based
on their subjective condition.406 Someone with a mental health
diagnosis, who experiences a civil rights violation, is effectively
rebuffed as “abnormal” and “unreasonable” should they experience
emotional distress differently than an “ordinary” civil rights plaintiff.

3.

When “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress Rewrites Civil
Claims

The “garden variety” approach does more damage to the truthseeking function of courts than any marginally relevant evidence
protected by a privilege. It encourages plaintiffs to reduce or
fictionalize their mental condition or emotional response to preserve
the privilege.407 For example, in Flowers, describing one’s fears and
testifying as to the symptoms of emotional distress came too close to
agoraphobia and PTSD, and the court waived the privilege.408
Similarly, the Santelli court held that descriptions of sleeplessness,
nervousness, and depression went beyond the scope of “garden
If one’s emotional distress
variety” emotional distress.409
approximates a diagnosable condition in the DSM, courts waive the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.410
Plaintiffs, therefore, are
encouraged to limit their damage claims and testimony to purely
subjective statements, such as sadness, humiliation, embarrassment,
and fear.
Incarcerated persons may find navigating the “garden”
extraordinarily difficult. The “garden” is both ill-defined and
decontextualized from the experience of prison. Prisons are not
open-air patches of flowers, but penal institutions made from
concrete and steel. Incarcerated persons who bring civil rights claims

405. Id. at 141.
406. Id.
This runs counter to federal policy seeking to eliminate bias,
discrimination, and the stigma that surrounds mental illness. SUBSTANCE ABUSE &
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH ACTION AGENDA (2005), http://media.samhsa.gov/
Federalactionagenda/NFC_TOC.aspx [https://perma.cc/UNS7-CM9S].
407. Anderson, supra note 216, at 142.
408. Flowers v. Owens, 274 F.R.D. 218, 227 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
409. Santelli v. Electro-Motive, 188 F.R.D. 306, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
410. Flowers, 274 F.R.D. at 228.

960

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

may adversely affect their credibility and misrepresent their
demeanor trying to stay within the garden’s boundaries.411 Lay juries
may question rights claims arising in prison to an even further extent.
And, coupled with the enormity of PLRA barriers, these hurdles may
foreclose the vindication of the rights of the incarcerated.
CONCLUSION

Jaffee established an absolute psychotherapist-patient evidentiary

privilege, but recognized that the privilege may be waived under
certain circumstances.412 Implied waiver of the psychotherapistpatient privilege has produced extensive case law and three legal
categories that govern its scope: broad, narrow, and middle views.413
Federal courts have varied widely on which approach to adopt and,
even, on their interpretation of the same categorical approach.414
Variations either depend on the facts of the case or are entirely
decontextualized. Currently, the “broad” view of waiver has won
over most circuits, but a growing number of district courts have
qualified the waiver to exclude “garden variety” emotional distress.
It is foreseeable that the “middle” view will eventually supersede the
“broad” view.415
Prison litigation and the realities of incarceration, however, may
shed new light on the “narrow” approach. Incarcerated persons who
wish to vindicate their civil rights after a physical assault may find
themselves trapped in the labyrinthine “garden” of prison
litigation.416 Under the broad view of waiver, the Hobson’s choice of
waiving the privilege and filing suit as opposed to not filing at all is a
stark reality. Moreover, the middle view that preserves the privilege
for “garden variety” claims of mental or emotional distress is
insufficient. Incarcerated persons who diminish their claims to fall
within the “garden” and preserve their privilege may inadvertently
self-discredit their claim after a physical assault.
“Normalizing” mental or emotional injuries to simple, subjective
adjectives runs against tort law principles, undermines federal civil
rights policy, imposes more barriers upon incarcerated plaintiffs, and
further excludes persons with mental illness from the law and
“normal” society. Courts, therefore, should reconsider the narrow
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Anderson, supra note 216, at 143.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 n.14 (1996).
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.C.1.
See Orenstein, supra note 385, at 698-701.
See generally In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008).
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view of waiver in the context of prison litigation, return the
psychotherapist-patient privilege to the privilege holder, restore legal
agency to incarcerated civil rights plaintiffs, and guard against the
stigma of mental illness and imposition of a normative response to
civil rights violations.

